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Abstract
This paper explores the determinants of bilateral remittance ows at the country-level; specically, insti-
tutional quality, wellbeing, and culture using a novel dataset published by Ratha and Shaw (2007). Next, we
look for support in the German Socio-Economic Panel using individual level regressions which allows us: (i)
to control for various individual correlates and xed eects, and (ii) to analyze remittances sent for dierent
purposes separately. We uncover important relationships with these unique datasets. The country-level
results indicate; (i) classical gravity equation variables explain bilateral remittance ows (ii) institutional
quality, wellbeing and cultural dierences play important role in explaining bilateral remittance ows (iii)
nancial variables such as exchange rate and interest rate dierentials matter as well. Institutional quality
matters more for remittance ows between high-income countries and between low-income countries but it
does not explain the remittance ows from high-income to low-income countries. Cultural dierences become
a more dominant factor in explaining the ows between low-income countries. These ndings are also sup-
ported by the individual level analysis. In addition, German migrants send less money back home when they
feel like more German and become home-owners. Countries receive less remittances from Germany when
they become happier, their health-care and social-security system improve but receive more with condence
in government, chance of war, and improved political system. These institutional factors only matter for
remittances sent for family support. Financial variables such interest rate and exchange rate dierentials
however, only matter for remittances sent for savings purposes. The results have important policy impli-
cations. Institutions matter for remittances but treating whole institutions as one in this framework can
be misleading. The role of nancial variables, indicators of institutions, and culture depend on the form of
remittance and the characteristics of receiving and sending countries.
JEL Classication: F36, F155, F41, G11, G12.
Keywords: Bilateral cross-country remittance data, individual-level remittance data, institutional quality,
wellbeing, gravity equations.
1 Introduction
The perpetual movement of people across countries and the opportunities for migration have become more
accessible in the developing nations with the need for skilled and inexpensive labor. This widespread movement
of people between the developing and developed nations transforms not only the lives of that migrant population
but also inuences the lives of those family members in the home country through remittance ows. The
interest on the eects of migration in the development agenda is the growing signicance of income transfers
from migrants to their families back home, i.e. international migrant remittances (Cordova, Lopez and Olmedo,
2006).
While remittances may raise the recipient country's development indicators, they can help overcome some
of the factors hindering household welfare by equalizing the distribution of income, reducing poverty, nancing
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mail:H.Ozer-Balli@massey.ac.nz.education, health, entrepreneurial development and by providing a stable source of foreign currency (Lopez-
Cordova and Olmedo, 2006). However, in assessing the development impact of remittances two issues must be
noted. As the process of migration and remittances are intertwined, i.e. remittances cannot happen without
migration, attention to remittances from the policy perspective has been aimed to facilitate international income
transfers and its developmental impact. Also, as remittances are counter-cyclical than other sources of income
such as wages or government transfers allow households to diversify risk and smooth consumption. Given the
growing prominence of remittances it is then natural to ask whether it improves development prospects in
developing nations, or as Kapur (2004) states whether remittances are simply a \new development mantra", a
fad that may soon subside.
The determinants of remittance and benets to the individuals and the economy have been vital in estimat-
ing the developmental role of remittances at the national and household levels while assisting the households
in their consumption activities and investment in education, health, and livelihood activities. Given the grow-
ing prominence of remittances, the paper makes a three-fold contribution to this literature by utilizing the
cross-country and individual-level regressions to explore the determinants of bilateral remittance ows such
as institutional quality, wellbeing, and culture. These hypotheses ll the gap in the existing remittances lit-
erature and contribute to the debate of the impact of remittance in three important ways. (1) We focus on
cross-country analysis in a baseline model using a novel dataset published by Ratha and Shaw (2007) to test the
impact of gravity equation variables (bilateral trade, distance, share a border) as well as economic and nancial
variables. (2) We examine the relationship between the level of bilateral remittance ows, institutional quality
and the wellbeing variables. (3) The third aspect of the investigation relates to cultural dierences (through
religion) to the level of remittance ows between the sending and recipient countries.
At the micro-level analysis, the three-fold investigations are applied using the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) to examine the links between the level of bilateral remittance ows, institutional quality, nancial
indicators, and wellbeing with individual-level remittance transfers and to quantify the eect of individual
characteristics (such as behavioral nature of a sense of belonging in the host country). The contribution here
is that (i) we can identify the importance of our variables of interest in explaining remittances not only for
total remittances sent but also for remittances sent for family support and for savings purposes separately. (ii)
we can control for many individual correlates, country and individual xed eects which will provide better
estimates.
Studies of remittances seek to explain the motivations why individuals remit and understanding these
motivations explain the private nature of remittances ows. Although remittances are regarded as private
ows between individuals and their families, the eects of migrants' remittances are economy wide. There has
been considerable debate on the developmental impact of remittances on developing countries, particularly
those characterized by intense outward migration. On the one hand, the relationship between remittances
and macroeconomic factors investigate the inuence of remittances on macroeconomic conditions of receiving
countries, remittances-growth nexus with the perspectives of nancial development, quality of institutions,
export sector, level of inequality, poverty, human capital, and income distribution.1 Many of the ndings in
1Various studies in these areas include Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), Catrinescu et al. (2009), Amuedo-Dorantes and
2these studies, however, are contradictory.2 An extensive survey on the determinants of remittances which
include both cross-country and individual-level studies has recently been provided by Carling (2008). On the
other hand, behavioral factors have been crucial to understand remittance ows and its impact at the household
level.3 Altruism also has dierent eects explained by various behavioral factors (Funkhouse (1995)).
On the relationship between institutional quality and wellbeing, using both regional and country-level
data, studies have also shown that measures of social capital and trust are strongly correlated with happiness
(Bjrnskov (2006), Helliwell (2006), Helliwell et al. (2009)). Institutional factors in the form of direct democracy
and federal structure raise self-reported individuals' well-being in a cross-regional analysis. This relationship
is due to political outcomes closer to voters' preferences, as well as to the procedural utility of political
participation possibilities (Frey and Stutzer (2000)).4 Moreover, individuals declare themselves to be happier
when the party they support is in power. Recessions create psychic losses that extend beyond the fall in GDP
and rise in the number of people unemployed, and higher unemployment benets are associated with higher
national well-being. Economic development, democratization, and increasing social tolerance have increased
the extent to which people perceive that they have free choice, which in turn has led to higher levels of happiness
explained by the human development model (Inglehart et al.(2008)).
In our baseline model using cross-country data, we nd that gravity equation variables matter for bilateral
remittance ows with the expected signs. We nd that GDP per capita dierences (real income of sending
country minus real income of receiving country) positively eects the amount of the bilateral remittance ows.
Immigrants living in the richer countries will be paid more, consequently they have more wealth accumulation
to send back home. Relative interest rates of source country lessen the remittances sent as expected. Migrants
probably prefer to invest their money in the country which has a higher interest rate and provides higher return.
We also observe that cultural dierences are signicantly important in explaining the bilateral remittance
ows. Sub-sample analysis reveal more interesting results. Interest rate dierentials become insignicant in
explaining bilateral remittance ows among low-income countries. Volatility of exchange rate dierentials is
signicant for the entire sample but it is insignicant when we restrict the bilateral remittance ows between
low-income countries. But, it can predict the ows between high-income countries. The cross religion dummies
are used to measure the cultural dierences and indicate that among low-income countries the amount of
remittance transfers increase when the population of the sending country and the recipient country follow
dierent religions from each other. The same variables are insignicant when we do the estimations among
Pozo (2004, 2006), Acosta et al. (2008, 2006), Calero et al. (2009), Freund and Spatafora (2008), Amuedo-Dorantes and Mazzo-
lari (2008) Adams and Page (2005), Osili and Paulson (2008), Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006), Chami et al. (2005) De Haas (2005),
Goldring (2004), Rozelle et al. (1999), Barham and Boucher (1998), Taylor and Wyatt (1996), Stark et al. (1986).
2While several studies have found mixed evidence Catrinescu et al. (2009) point out that this could be due to omitted variable
bias, and specically, remittances will be more likely to contribute to longer-term growth in countries with higher quality political
and economic policies and institutions.
3Ilahi and Saqib (1999) nd that remittance to the immediate family and savings retained abroad both fall with the pre-
migration loan. Changes in return plans could also inuence remittance ows (Mestres and Dustmann (2010)). Amuedo-Dorantes
and Pozo (2006) nd that the dollar amount remitted increases rst with time spent but declines after ve and a half years in the
case of United States. Remittance decay occurs at a faster rate for migrants maintaining weaker ties to Mexico and up to three
years later for their counterparts with spouses back in their origin communities.
4Oswald et al. (2001) nd that the rates of price change and joblessness aect life satisfaction. Growth is found to be related to
well-being (Oswald (1997)). Alesina et al. (2004) nd a negative relationship between inequality and happiness using country-level
analysis. Movements in well-being are correlated with changes in macroeconomic variables such as gross domestic product (GDP)
(Di Tella et al. (2003)).
3high-income countries. These results suggest that the importance of variables in explaining remittances depend
not only on the economic characteristics but also on the cultural heritage of the sending and the receiving
countries. Financial variables seem to matter more for remittance ows between high income countries but,
cultural dierences (through religion dummies) appears to be important for the ows between low-income
countries. We also investigate the role of institutions and wellbeing. After controlling the factors discussed
above, we nd that countries with better institutions (relative to sending countries) attract more remittances.
Institutional quality is important in particular in explaining the bilateral remittance transfers from high-income
to high-income countries and from low-income to low-income countries. However institutional quality measures
are insignicant for the bilateral ows from high-income to low-income countries.
The ndings to assess the micro-level eects of culture, institutional quality and wellbeing on remittances
provide evidence that apart from the general factors that Dustmann and Mestres (2010) note, becoming a
house-owner in Germany forces immigrants to send less money back home. In addition, the extent to which
a society leads to a change in the behavioral nature of being a local or has a sense of belonging, we nd
that immigrants remit less money when they feel like German. Similar to the country level analysis, being
happy also plays a crucial role in determining the remittance ows. As the level of happiness increases in the
immigrants' country of origin, the amount of remittance ows decreases. Again, we nd crucial results with
respect to institutional quality. Immigrants in Germany tend to send more money back home when they have
condence with the home country's government and that the political conditions have improved. However,
less money is remitted as the social security system and health care system improves in the home country.
These institutional factors explain the remittances only sent for family support. On the other hand, nancial
variables can only predict remittances sent for savings purposes.
The results of these various hypotheses suggest that policy makers should focus more on the bilateral
linkages with the sending countries to promote remittance inows and the these linkages dier with respect to
the form of remittance. Also, the results emphasize the fact that for the remittance receiving country policies
should be directed to improve the quality of living standards and quality of the institutions to encourage higher
remittance inows and maximize its impact given that sending country is being happier relative to the recipient
country. The penultimate section discusses the literature followed by data, models and empirical results. The
nal section presents the conclusion.
2 Data
The national data on bilateral remittances are hard to obtain and its level of accuracy can be questioned as
funds channeled through international banks may be attributed to a country other than the actual source
country. Despite the shortcomings some studies have estimated the impact of bilateral remittance ows.5 In
5Schiopu and Siegfried (2006) create a new panel data set of bilateral ows for 21 Western European and 7 European Union
(EU) neighboring countries. Similarly, Jimnez-Martin, Jorgensen, and Labeaga (2007) estimate bilateral workers remittance ows
from all 27 members of the EU to recipient countries. On the other hand, Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008) have employed the largest
known bilateral data-set to date to a group of developing countries. Data query to the central banks of 33 developing countries
with signicant remittance receipts in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East have produced bilateral remittance data for 11 recipient
countries. In addition, Inter-American Development bank has collected data on bilateral remittances from the US to countries in
the Central American region for 2005.
4order to measure the eect of wellbeing, quality of institutions and culture on bilateral remittance ows, a
broad dataset is employed to evaluate these hypotheses. However due to changes in the economic and cultural
conditions of the sending and recipient countries using a restricted data set would not provide clear implications
of the eects of these variables. Therefore we utilize the dataset created by Ratha and Shaw (2007) to explore
the determinants of bilateral remittance ows. In the absence of hard bilateral data, they have calculated
bilateral remittances by allocating remittances received by each developing country among the countries of
destination of its migrant nationals.
They use three dierent allocation rules: (i) weights based on migrant stocks abroad; (ii) weights based on
migrant incomes, proxied by migrant stocks multiplied by per capita income in the destination countries; and
(iii) weights that take into account migrants incomes abroad as well as source-country incomes (the data sets
can be accessed for these methods in Ratha and Shaw (2007). The bilateral matrix covers 212 countries, of
which 154 are low- and middle-income countries, 24 are high-income Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries, and 34 are high-income countries that are not members of the OECD.6
The immigrant ows data is employed in order to create the remittance ows per capita between the sending
and recipient countries. On the right hand side, we have a substantial number of variables to control for the
determinants of remittance ows via macro level analysis. Bilateral trade volume in USD between the sending
and recipient country is obtained from IMF's Direction of Trade database. To create cross section variable for
bilateral trade, we average bilateral trade between the sending and recipient countries for the period 2001 to
2005. Interest rate is obtained from IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. We average the
interest rates between 1996 and 2005 to eliminate the seasonality and the spikes in the data. Exchange rate
dataset is also obtained from IMF's IFS database, i.e. the national currency per USD for the last 15 years
and estimate the standard deviation to proxy for the volatility in exchange rate. The economic size of the
countries is measured by real GDP per capita (i.e. average GDP per capita for 2001-2005). The other gravity
equation variables include dummy variables for colony, distance between nancial centers, common language,
sharing same border, practicing same religion are employed based on the Centre D'Etudes Prospectives et
D'Informations Internationales (CEPII).
Institutional quality is rst measured using Transparency International's corruption perception index (CPI)
data since 1995. This index measures institutional quality in ve major areas: (1) size of government, (2)
legal structure and security of property rights, (3) access to sound money, (4) exchange with foreigners, and
(5) regulation of capital, labor, and businesses. We use CPI to measure the degree to which corruption is
perceived to exist amongst the institutions. For the cross sectional data we averaged the CPI index between
2001 and 2005.7 In addition to CPI, other indices employed are civil rights, freedom of expression of belief and
functioning of government from Freedom House. We employ these 5 sub-indices to measure the quality of life
standards. Variables have been averaged taking the common denominator for each index for each country.8
6The University of Sussex data set employs national censuses, population registers, national statistical bureaus and a number
of secondary sources (OECD, ILO, MPI, DFID, UN) to compile bilateral migrant stocks for the dataset.
7A number of studies use CPI, to cite just a few see Husted (1999), Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Seligson (2002), Balli et
al. (2009).
8The values for each variable range between 0-7 and 0-15, these are adjusted where the maximum value correspond to the
highest standards.
52.1 German Socio-economic Panel and Euro-barometer data
Analyzing the determinants of the remittance ows with individual level data, we use 12 waves of the German
Socio-Economic panel data for the period 1984-1995.9 The GSOEP data contains interview results of about
4500 households of German-born household head and about 1500 households of foreign-born household head
in the rst wave. In this analysis we use observations for the foreign born category from the over-sample and
standard sample. The data are both qualitative and quantitative in nature. Immigrants are asked whether
they remit for each of the above purposes. It distinguishes between remittances for family support, remittances
for saving purposes in the home country, and remittances for other motives. All monetary variables (including
remittances and savings) are in real values. In addition, the individual and household characteristics in the
host country, as well as information on family members who are living in the country of origin are reported.
There are 10,144 household-head observations (with 1802 household-heads), 57 percent of the households have
sent money back home and 43 percent did not, 88 percent of the sample consists of male headed households
and 12 percent are female headed.
The World Values Survey (WVS) reports data between 1980 and 1995 which covers the rst 2 waves and
the Euro-barometer data between 1984 and 1995. We construct country averages for each year for the following
variables from Euro-barometer survey: satisfaction with life (1-5), satisfaction with the democracy (1-5), overall
happiness (1-5), political discussions, peacefulness, importance of religion, political ideology (on a scale 0-10).
The WVS data-set includes happiness, life satisfaction as a whole, trust, etc. The GSOEP data-set provides
information on the country of origin which enables to match the WVS and Euro-barometer for the year and
country of origin of the immigrants in Germany for accuracy.10
3 Empirical models: Cross-country and individual-level framework
The macroeconomic framework is based on two empirical models. First, we employ gravity equation variables
to explain the bilateral trade and portfolio ows and its impact on bilateral remittance ows.11 Gravity
equation for the portfolio ows or trade ows states that the amount of bilateral ows between the source
and host country are in relation to countries' economic sizes, distance between the countries, some physical
and cultural proximity, such as shared border, language relationship or common colonial history. The gravity
equation takes the following econometric form:
REMITTANCEij = 0 + 1Tij + 2Zi j + 3BANKj + "ij; (1)
9The GSOEP is a household-based panel data for the resident immigrant population in Germany that provides a rich set of
survey questions on remittances and savings. The data-set is unique in providing information on a sample of immigrants over a
long period of time. Each individual in the household over the age of 16 is interviewed and the household head provides information
about individuals in the household below the interviewing age.
10The ve waves of the WVS and European Values Surveys are for the periods 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1995-1997, 1999-2004, and
2006-2008. The variables used are described in Appendix Tables A1, A2, A3 and A4.
11Portes and Rey (2005), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) apply gravity equations to explain the determinants of bilateral equity
and portfolio volumes, and Deardor (1984) employs gravity equations to estimate bilateral trade ows.
6where REMITTANCEij is the remittance ows from sending country (i) to recipient country (j) per migrants
residing in the sending country, expressed in logarithmic terms. Tij is a vector of potential factors inuencing
remittance ows.(Colony dummies, sharing same border dummy, common language dummy, Physical distance,
Trade volume) Zi j contains economic and nancial variables that are created by subtracting Zj from Zi.
Those variables include, real GDP per capita(in USD), interest rate, volatility of exchange rate. BANKj is an
index created to measure how deep is the nancial sector in the recipient country. It has been used to proxy
for the transaction costs in the source country.12
Second, in addition to the gravity equation, we control for the cultural dierences, institutional quality
and life satisfaction dierences between the sending and recipient country. The estimated equation takes the
following form:
REMITTANCEij = 0 + 1Tij + 2Zi j + 3BANKj + 4Ynij + 5Xi j + "ij; (2)
Cultural dierences are proxied by cross-religion dummies, Ynij. Ynij contains the cross religion binary
variables between the sending and the recipient country. For example, CHRISTnij is a binary variable that takes
the value of 1 when the sending country (i) is non-Christian and the receiving country is Christian. Xi j
contains variables that measure the quality of institutions, and quality of life levels between the sending and
receiving country. Both these models are estimated using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
methodology. To control for endogenity, we apply the instrumental variable (IV) technique after specifying
endogenous variables in the above models.
In the microeconomic analysis we estimate log of remittances value sent as a function of the household
characteristics, i.e. household income, dwelling ownership, number of children and adults in Germany, children
and spouse in the home country, and of the household head's characteristics, i.e. years since migration, years
since migration squared, childhood residence, age, employment status, gender, years of education, together
with year and country of origin dummies. The dependent variable (log of remittances) takes the value 1 for
those households who have not sent any remittances. The OLS estimation methodology used for the basic
specications ease the interpretation of the results than the probability models.13 Some specications also
are based on individual xed eects. The standard errors are clustered by the household heads in the OLS
specications.14
The descriptive statistics for the macroeconomic and microeconomic estimations are presented in Appendix
Tables A1{A4. The macroeconomic characteristics shown in the Appendix Tables A1 reect the cross-country
remittance ows, nancial, institutional, life satisfaction and cultural aspects used in the gravity equations.
Majority of these factors have positive coecients which explain the bilateral remittances ows. The immigrant
household heads descriptive statistics are presented in Table A2. The average household head age is around 43
12Freund and Spatafora (2008) used this variable as a proxy for the transaction costs for sending money to the source country
and they found signicant results.
13We also estimate the regressions using Tobit models as well as Probit models and nd that results are similar to OLS results.
14Also, dummy variables for country of origin are not included in the OLS specication if the independent variables of interest
do not change over time (for instance, distance between Germany and the country of origin).
7and 8 percent own their house, 82 percent is employed and 87 percent is male. The average years of education
level is 9.4 years, 80 percent are married and 6 percent has a spouse abroad and 10 percent has kids back in the
home country. Duration of stay in Germany is around 19 years and 40 percent has lived in a country-side back
at home. Descriptive statistics for the main variables by country of origin are shown in Table A3, 32 percent
of the sample comes from Turkey and 16 percent are from Ex-Yugoslavia. Albania has the highest score at 74
percent that sent money back home, however in terms of per household Spaniards have sent most money in
total remittance. There is some persistence in remittance sending behavior seen in Table A4. The probability
of not sending money in the next period conditional on not sending money in this period is around 80 percent.
4 Empirical Results
The estimated results are based on various hypotheses to observe the gravity equation determinants of remit-
tance ows, and its link between institutional quality, wellbeing variables, and cultural diversity. Equations
1 and 2 are computed using cross-country bilateral remittance observations for 149 recipient countries and
an average of 166 sending countries. The micro-level analysis links bilateral remittance ows to institutional
quality and wellbeing using individual-level remittance transfers, and quantify the eect of behavioral nature of
a sense of belonging in the host country. To our knowledge such analysis (merging household-level information
with country-level data) has not been done before. Overall the results have a relatively high explanatory power
and these new ndings contribute signicantly to the remittances literature.
4.1 Cross-country analysis
Table 1 presents the estimated results using pooled OLS for the entire sample. Consistent with the previous
studies (see Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008)), we nd that the gravity equation variables are signicant in
explaining bilateral remittance ows (column (1)). Bilateral trade volume between the recipient and the
sending country is highly signicant, intuitively the increased volume of trade between the countries makes
nancial and economic connections stronger, thereby leading to comparative advantage in a wider transfer
between these countries. Sharing same border makes the transfer of money easier between the sending and
recipient countries. This is intuitive as ease of traveling between the countries may encourage immigrants
to send money for investment purposes. Having a common language has a negative and signicant eect,
it emphasizes that having same language between the sending and receiving countries helps them to adapt
in residing country and may encourage to spend (invest) more in the residing country rather than remitting
funds. Among the colonies, being a former Spanish colony negatively relates to remittance ows as for the
British colony, whereas being a French colony has a positive and signicant eect (column (4)). Economic
and nancial condition dierentials have a signicant role in explaining the bilateral remittance ows. The
GDP per capita coecient is positive and signicant indicating that as the sending country is richer compared
to the recipient country, the immigrants in the sending country is expected to send more money back home.
Volatility of exchange rate dierences is highly signicant in explaining the remittance ows which suggests
that high volatility in exchange rate tends to decrease levels of transfer that decreases the exchange rate
8risk in their future investments. The variable Bankj, proxies for transaction costs to measure the possible
impact in bilateral remittance ows (See Freund and Spatafora (2008)). For the entire sample, we observe that
immigrants care about the transaction costs when they are sending money back home and they send more
when the transactions costs are lower.
Bilateral trade and interest rate dierentials are corrected for endogeneity using instrumental variable (IV)
regressions (column (3)). For this specications, we employ the lags of trade and interest rate dierentials as
instrumental variables. The estimated coecients provide similar signs as in column (1), interestingly interest
rate dierentials that is not signicant in Column (1), become negative and highly signicant in column (3).
The economic intuitive nding suggests that immigrants would hold their earnings in the residing country as the
investment returns are more appealing in their residing countries. Column (2), in addition to gravity equation
variables, includes the cross-religion binary variables.15 The ndings show that among all major religions the
immigrants that follow Islam, Confucianism, and Orthodox Church have a tendency to send more money when
they were living in countries where their citizens follow other religions. The Hindu coecient though positive
is not signicant. However, Christian and Buddhist immigrants transfer less money back home. These ndings
are similar to Column (4) with the IV estimation results. Indeed, some of the binary religion variables may
be explained by the fact that the entire sample contains high-income Christian populated countries and their
citizens living abroad do not consider to remit.
The next step involves investigating remittances ows by grouping nations according to income levels,
i.e. high-income and low-income sub-samples constructed with respect to the income levels of both sending
and receiving countries. Table 2 presents the sub-sample results of baseline regressions. Column (1) is the
high-income group, i.e. when both receiving and sending country are member of high income countries. The
determinants of remittance ows between higher income countries show that GDP per capita dierences do
not have a signicant impact on remittance ows. This supports the view that immigrants may have other
motives then income dierences when they are from high income countries and living in another high income
country. However, volatility of exchange rate dierentials and interest rate dierentials are signicant and in
expected signs suggesting that immigrants might may have stronger investment motives. Unlike the Table 1
results, essentially, the transaction cost, bank cost and distance variables are not statistically signicant which
supports the view that cost of remitting money through nancial institutions are low between high-income
countries. Therefore it should not be a factor for the immigrants to restrict the money transfers. The results
for the former colonies show that remitting funds from a British colony has declined, however the Spanish
colonial relationship is positive but not signicant (Table 2, column (1)).
In the sub-sample of high-income to low-incomes countries (Column (2)), the results are quite similar to
the previous ones. The most important result in this table is in the sample for ow of remittances within
the low-income countries (column 3). All cross-religion dummies have positive and signicant eects.16 These
results indicate that immigrants remit more when they feel culturally alienated in the country they are residing
15These binary variables take the value of 1 when the recipient country's citizens follow religion X, and the sending country's
citizens follow another religion.
16Estimations containing gravity variables for all sub-samples are not reported here due to brevity, this result is available from
the authors on request. Also, the Adjusted R
2 value increases from 55 to 71 percent when the entire cross-religions are included.
9in. But this mostly holds for the low income groups. Amongst the low-income to high-income sub-samples
(column (4)) the estimated coecients do not have similar eects of all cross-religions. Overall, the results
support the view that, in particular, between low-income countries, immigrants tend to remit funds based
on religion purposes- a valid proxy for cross-cultural dierences -to their country of origin. It seems that
cross-cultural dierences are a crucial indicator in explaining bilateral remittance transfers among low income
countries.
Do institutional quality and wellbeing predict remittance ows? The estimated results of pooled OLS
method are reported in Tables 3 (whole sample) and 4 (income groupings).17 By employing various measures
of institutional quality, we test whether or not immigrants have other motives beyond nancial or cultural
factors when they decide the amount of the money remitted. Measures of institutional quality (i.e. corruption
index, civil rights, freedom, individual rights, rule of law and government) are included as dierences between
the sending country and the receiving country to measure the relative quality of institutions in the sending
country. The quality of institutions and the wellbeing in the sending country relative to the recipient country
are important determinants of remittance ows. Intuitively, we test if the immigrants are more motivated to
hold their savings in the residing country instead sending money back home when sending country has better
institutions.
The panel A of Table 3 shows that all measures of institutional quality are negative and signicant thereby
indicating that better quality of institutions in the sending country (i.e. have civil rights, being able to express
beliefs more freely, have individual social and economic rights, have rule of law and government functioning)
motivate the immigrants to remit less money.18 In addition, we also test for the wellbeing variables in country
level basis. The panel B of Table 3 shows the estimated coecients of wellbeing variables (i.e. happiness,
satisfaction of life, prohibit, ght). In each separate regression, wellbeing variables have a positive and highly
signicant impact on remittance ows. The positive coecient on happiness is intuitive since as the average
immigrant is happier in the country he is residing in, he is considering his bonds in the country of origin,
therefore he is sending more money back home. The ght variable measures the relative patriotism between
the sending and recipient countries. The coecient is positive and signicant indicating that immigrants living
in more \patriotic" countries are sending more money back home. The possible alienation of immigrants in the
host country might be reason for this positive coecient. Prohibit measures how hard immigrants policies are
in the sending country. So as the policies becomes harder it will be more dicult to send money back. We can
measure it with negative signicant coecient in the Panel B. Again, the possible alienation of immigrants in
the host country might be reason for this.
Table 4 contains the baseline regressions including each institutional quality variable separately for dierent
income groups. The ndings show that the eects of quality institutions are signicant for only high-income
countries. The results indicate that high-income immigrants tend to send less money when they live in a
high income country with high quality institutions. To give an example; an immigrant from high income
17We control for the gravity equation variables in these regressions, but we only report the coecients on institutional quality
and wellbeing measures.
18As government, rule of law and individual rights are correlated with each other we drop rule of law and individual rights
variables in the joint estimation.
10country with low quality of institutions, say Italy, residing in a high income country with better quality of
institutions, say Denmark, are sending less money back home. When we test those variables jointly, the
Adjusted R2 increases from 48 percent to 65 percent amongst high income countries, indicating how important
the institutional quality variables are in explaining the remittance transfers. When we restrict the sample with
sending county is a high-income country and the recipient country is low-income country, we nd similar results
(Column 2). However, in other sub samples, when sending country is a high income country and recipient
country is a low-income country and vice versa, the quality institutions variables are not statistically signicant.
In particular, the results for transfers from high-income to low-income countries is interesting and intuitive. It
appears that immigrants living in a better country have more important motives than quality of institutions
in the home country. Altruism and family ties might overcome the institutional quality in this aspect.
The estimated wellbeing variables (happiness, satisfaction of life) are signicant for almost every sub-sample
group in Table 4. In addition, prohibit and ght variables are used to control for other wellbeing factors. The
ght coecient shows positive and signicant impacts on remittances, thus higher patriotism in the sending
country might alienate the immigrants more and therefore remit more. Harder immigrant policies in the sending
country (lower prohibit index) may force immigrants to remit more for future investment back home, therefore
higher returns from remittances. As expected the estimated prohibit coecient is negative and signicant
in Table 3, but with dierent sub-sample groups of Table 4, only high-income country shows a negative and
signicant impact.
4.2 Individual-level analysis
Table 5 presents the OLS estimates using GSOEP data for the remittance ows on individual characteristics
in Germany.19 The nding indicates that marital status does not matter for the level of remittance ows.
Household income is positively correlated with remittances. Unemployed migrants and migrants not in the
labor force remit less than employed ones. Households with a male household head send more remittances
than for female headed ones. Older people send more remittances than younger ones. Years of schooling is
negatively correlated with the level of remittance ows. Number of adults, children, and employed people in
Germany are negatively related to remittances. Thus, higher number of adults and children lead to lower levels
of remittance sent to receiving countries. Also, fewer number of people employed in the households lead to
lower levels of remittance ows. On the other hand, people with a spouse or children back at home remit more
money. The relationship between the duration of stay in Germany and remittances is an inverted-U shape,
i.e. as the years of duration increase so does the level of remittance ows but it declines as the migrants have
lived in Germany for longer duration. Migrants from rural areas have a higher level of remittance ows. The
estimated R2 value is highest for remittances sent for family.
In the next step, the role of other individual characteristics are investigated on remittances sent (Table 6).
Becoming a home owner decreases total remittances and all three form of remittances. People who think
nding a similar job to the one they have send more money and this is signicant even after controlling
19Model specication and independent variables are based on the study by Dustmann and Mestress (2009). Dependent variables
are log total remittances, log remittances sent to the family, log remittances sent for savings purposes and other reasons.
11xed eects. Feeling German, cooking German food, and listening to German music negatively and strongly
relates to remittances. These variables do not change much over time therefore xed eects regressions is
only signicant for feeling German in explaining remittances sent for other reasons. Migrants who are more
satised with their jobs send less money and this is signicant even after controlling xed eects. Annual
doctor visits are negatively correlated with total remittances, for family reasons, and other reasons but do not
change remittances for savings purposes. On the other hand, the xed eects results show that having a life
insurance leads to lower levels of remittance ows.
Table 7 presents the estimated results for investigating the relationship between remittances and the charac-
teristics of receiving countries, based on the Euro-barometer data. Higher levels of happiness and peacefulness
in the receiving country lead to a decline in remittances. Both the OLS and xed eects estimates show the
importance of religion and rightist political ideology in the receiving country reduces remittances sent from
Germany. Next, in Table 9, we use OLS to evaluate the role of receiving country's characteristics on remit-
tances sent from Germany. There is only one value for each country of origin in this specication. Happiness
negatively correlates to low remittance ows. Moreover, condence in the social security system and health
care relates to decline in total remittances and family remittance ows. However migrants send more money
when the condence in the government in their home country is higher. Higher levels of life satisfaction and
democracy in the home countries decrease the ow of remittances. In addition, higher level of trust in the
home country also decreases remittances.
The chance of involvement in a war in the home country increases total remittances, remittances for family
support and other purposes as well as for savings purposes. Political ideology, in terms of rightism, decreases
remittances. Home countries with a good political system receive less remittances however improvement in
the political system increases remittances. Table 8 shows that more corrupt countries receive lower levels of
remittances, however home countries with more freedom and civil rights receive higher remittance ows from
Germany. On the other hand, exchange rate volatility, interest rate, and bilateral trade ows in Germany
contribute to remittances sent for savings purposes but do not explain any other purpose. Migrants remit
more to their home country when dierences in exchange rate declines. Higher interest rates in Germany
decreases remittances sent for savings purposes. Increase in bilateral trade over time with the home country
and Germany relates to higher amount of remittances sent for savings purposes and other purposes. These
results suggest that migrant consider the nancial variables when sending money for only savings purposes.
However, they do care about the institutions instead when sending money back home for their families to
support them. The results with respect to happiness might imply that money sent for family support is a
way of transferring utility between household members living in dierent countries and as the wellbeing in the
receiving and sending countries gets closer remittances decrease in response.
5 Conclusion
We analyze the determinants of bilateral remittance ows using cross-country and individual-level data. Our
contribution is to explain how the quality of institutions, wellbeing, and culture in both sending and recipient
12countries aect the amount of bilateral remittance ows. In the cross-country regressions our main variables of
interest are found to be important factors in explaining the bilateral remittance ows in addition to the gravity
equation variables. Sub-sample analysis provide very interesting results. Financial variables, i.e volatility of
exchange rate dierentials and interest rate dierentials matter for the bilateral remittance ows between high
income countries whereas those variables are statistically insignicant among low-income countries. However,
culture and religion play more important role in explaining bilateral remittances between low-income countries.
The quality of institutions in the sending country relative to the recipient country matters, and it's distinc-
tive and signicant in determining the remittance ows among high-income countries and among low-income
countries. On the other hand, institutions can not predict remittances sent from high-income to low-income
countries. Indeed, immigrants living in a richer sending country might have other motives such as altruism or
strong family ties with the home country therefore they do not care much about the institutions of the home
country when they have enough wealth accumulation. However immigrants residing in relatively poor countries
consider the quality of institutions more when they decide to remit money back home. The signicant results
for the wellbeing variables indicate that as the sending country is happier relative to the recipient country the
amount of remittance transfers between sending and recipient country increases.
The individual level GSOEP data also provide some key ndings for our investigation. Immigrants who
integrate into German life-style (dwelling owner, feel like German, listen German music, cook German food)
remit less money back home. The higher living standards of happiness, peacefulness, religiosity motivates the
immigrants to send less money. Institutional quality is important but the relationship between remittances and
dierent aspects of institutions dier signicantly. Corruption reduces remittance ows but freedom and civil
rights of the receiving countries lead to positive impacts. Factors such as condence in government, rightist
political ideology, and improvement in political system in the country of origin motivate the immigrants to
remit more money. Improvement in factors such as life satisfaction, democracy and condence in social security
system in the country of origin are crucial to improve the the amount of remittance ows. We also nd that as
the immigrants feel more alienated in the host country due to patriotism or immigration policies, they remit
more.
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17Table 1: Baseline regressions for the cross-country data: Full sample
Dependent variable: log (remittance per immigrant+1) i to j
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
TRADEij 3.54 3.81 4.02 3.72
(4.91) (5.29) (5.28) (4.83)
DISTANCEij  0.4  0.60 0.79 0.37
( 0.66) ( 2.01) (1.21) (1.37)
RGDP
i j 2.51 2.37 1.32 1.52
(12.55) (10.77) (4.44) (5.46)
INTEREST RATE
i j  0.07  0.07  0.14  0.14
(0.51) (0.54) (4.67) (4.81)
VOLEXCH
i j 3.18 3.25 4.71 4.72
(6.23) (4.92) (6.36) (6.12)
CONTIGIOUS 7.16 6.44 7.17 6.53
(6.98) (6.51) (8.74) (6.91)
COMMON LANGUAGE  3.47  3.74  3.82  3.18
( 3.54) ( 3.86) ( 4.19) ( 3.49)
BANKj  2.92  3.51  6.41  6.88
( 3.32) ( 3.85) ( 6.96) ( 6.523)
BRITISHij  1.68  0.74  2.12  1.21
( 1.64) ( 0.73) ( 2.03) ( 1.31)
SPANISHij  2.85  2.01  2.88  2.21
( 3.43) ( 2.42) ( 3.34) ( 2.32)
FRENCHij 0.41 0.43 0.32 0.33













CHRISTi MUSLIMj 4.11 4.33
(3.61) (3.04)
SAMPLE 4175 4175 4175 4175
ADJ:R2 0.49 0.52 0.48 0.52
Notes: Coecients are multiplied by 100. t-statistics are in parenthesis. Column (1) and Column (2) contains the pooled OLS
regressions. Column (3) and Column (4) contain the IV regressions. The dependent variable is Logarithm of the (Remittance
per immigrant+1). For the IV specications, we employ the lags of trade and interest rate dierentials as instrumental variables.
TRADEij is the volume of trade (in logarithms) between the sending country (i) and the recipient country (j), averaged over the
years between 2001 and 2005. DISTANCEij is the distance between the sending country (i) and the recipient country (j) and in
logarithms. RGDP
i j and INTEREST RATE
i j are the GDP per capita (in USD), and real interest rate dierences between the
sending and receiving country respectively. VOLEXCH
i j is the volatility of the exchange rate dierences between the sending and
receiving country. CONTIGIOUS is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when sending and recipient country shares a border,
and 0 otherwise. COMMON LANGUAGE is a dummy taking the value 1 if the majority of sending and recipient country uses the same
language, and 0 otherwise. BRITISHij, SPANISHij, and FRENCHij are dummy variables and equal to 1 if both sending and recipient
country has a British, Spanish or French colonial relationship in the past. BUDHISTnij,CHRISTnij,MUSLIMnij, HINDUnij,ORTHODOXnij
and CONFUCnij are opposite religion dummies. For example, BUDHISTnij takes 1 when the population of the recipient country
follows Buddhism and sending country's population does not. CHRISTi MUSLIMj is another binary variable and equals 1 when the
sending country's population is the followers of Christianity and the recipient country's population is the follower of Islam. BANKj
is an index created to measure how deep is the nancial sector in the recipient country.
18Table 2: Baseline regressions with dierent sub-samples
Dependent variable: log (remittance per immigrant+1) i to j
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sending country high income high income low income low income
Receiving country high income low income low income high income
TRADEij 4.25 3.87 1.88 2.85
(16.34) (26.22) (6.54) (6.88)
DISTANCEij  0.85 0.42  4.20  0.63
( 1.62) (0.78) ( 6.58) ( 0.53)
RGDP
i j  1.89 2.64 1.60  6.82
( 0.77) (3.46) (2.17) (3.30)
INTEREST RATE
i j  0.80  0.07  0.02  0.31
(2.44) ( 2.99) ( 1.07) ( 2.37)
VOLEXCH
i j 3.85 2.89 1.03 0.28
(5.27) (2.19) (1.01) (2.52)
CONTIGIOUS 4.68 3.48 4.36
(2.22) (1.65) (2.77)
COMMON LANGUAGE  2.16  1.43 3.23  2.69
( 3.22) ( 1.96) (2.23) ( 2.12)
BANKj 2.72  11.95  8.62 8.39
(1.01) ( 6.63) ( 3.68) (1.35)
BRITISHij  6.92  0.51 4.38  17.57
( 2.63) ( 0.34) (0.94) ( 4.21)
SPANISHij 0.93  5.08
(0.21) ( 2.86)
BUDHISTnij  6.04  6.38 6.56  3.36
( 2.52) (5.20) (2.62) (0.60)
CHRISTnij  4.56  1.40 7.88 2.06
( 2.76) (1.35) (4.54) (0.93)
MUSLIMnij 6:73 5.07 2.48 3.13
(2.71) (3.03) (2.28) (1.16)
HINDUnij  0:23 0.37
( 0.42) (0.34)
ORTHODOXnij 10.93 2.19 2.25  0.78
(5.21) (1.71) (3.29) ( 0.26)
CONFUCnij 15.79 25.42
(4.53) (6.72)
CHRISTi MUSLIMj 6.14 5.16 4.30 6.55
(3.30) (3.70) (3.87) (2.05)
SAMPLE 720 1108 186 155
ADJ:R2 0.48 0.56 0.71 0.62
Notes: Coecients are multiplied by 100. t-statistics are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Logarithm of the (remittance
per immigrant+1). Each column corresponds baseline regressions using the sub-samples generated based on income levels of the
sample countries. For example \High Income to High Income" refers to the sub-sample where both the sending and the recipient
countries are high income countries. TRADEij is the volume of trade (in logarithms) between (i) and (j), averaged over the years
between 2001 and 2005. DISTANCEij is the distance between between (i) and (j) and is in logarithms. RGDP
i j and INTEREST RATE
i j
are GDP per capita (in USD) and real interest rate dierences between the sending and receiving country respectively. VOLEXCH
i j
is the volatility of the exchange rate dierences between (i) and (j). CONTIGIOUS is a dummy variable which takes the value 1
when sending and recipient country shares a border, and 0 otherwise. COMMON LANGUAGE is a dummy taking the value 1 if the
majority of sending and recipient country uses the same language, and 0 otherwise. BRITISHij, SPANISHij, and FRENCHij are dummy
variables and equal to 1 if both sending and recipient country has a British, Spanish or French colonial relationship in the past.
BUDHISTnij,CHRISTnij,MUSLIMnij, HINDUnij,ORTHODOXnij and CONFUCnij are opposite religion dummies. For example, BUDHISTnij
takes 1 when the population of the recipient country follows Buddhism and sending country's population does not. CHRISTi MUSLIMj
is another binary variable and equals 1 when the sending country's population is the followers of Christianity and the recipient
country's population is the follower of Islam. BANKj is an index created to measure how deep is the nancial sector in the recipient
country.
19Table 3: Role of institutional quality and wellbeing: Full sample
Dependent variable: log (remittance per immigrant+1) i to j



















SAMPLE 3955 4175 4175 4175 4175 4175 4175
ADJ:R2 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.56













SAMPLE 4175 4175 4175 4175 4175
ADJ:R2 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.56
Notes: Coecients are multiplied by 100. t-statistics are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Logarithm of the (remittance
per immigrant+1). Every row corresponds to a separate regression and each regression has the baseline equation variables as in
Table 1 column(2). The quality of institution variables are the levels of institutional quality in the sending country relative to
the recipient country. Wellbeing measures are the levels of wellbeing in the sending country relative to recipient country. The
denitions of the variables are explained in the appendix.
20Table 4: Role of institutional quality and wellbeing: Sub-samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sending country high income high income low income low income
Receiving country high income low income low income high income
CORRUPTION
i j  1:33  0.32  0.63  0.32
( 7.01) ( 0.11) ( 5.02) ( 0.72)
CIVIL RIGHTS
i j  6:29  0.24  0.72  0.81
( 10.66) ( 0.81) ( 3.02) ( 0.79)
FREEDOM
i j  1:71 0.12  1.12  0.76
( 3.22) (0.66) ( 4.15) ( 1.24)
GOVERNMENT
i j  2:25  0.21  0.25  0.71
( 3.92) ( 0.10) ( 1.95) ( 1.86)
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
i j  1:90  0.08  0.22  0.81
( 1.80) ( 0.03) ( 2.25) ( 1.97)
RULE OF LAW
i j  1:16  0.12  0.24  0.84
( 3.74) ( 0.91) ( 1.91) ( 2.74)
HAPPINESS
i j 49.71 12.22 3.92 2.48
(7.53) (1.81) (2.68) (1.83)
FIGHT
i j 12.01 3.12 3.91 2.11
(3.23) (1.91) (2.18) (0.11)
PROHIBIT
i j  5.81  2.12 1.43  3.23
( 3.12) ( 0.42) (1.13) ( 0.43)
SATISFACTION OF LIFE
i j 0.34 5.31  12.81 4.91
(0.26) (3.23) ( 1.91) (2.58)
Notes: Coecients are multiplied by 100. t-statistics are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Logarithm of the (remittance
per immigrant+1). Every row corresponds to a separate regression and each regression has the baseline equation variables as in
Table 1 column(2). The quality of institution variables are the levels of institutional quality in the sending country relative to
the recipient country. Wellbeing measures are the levels of wellbeing in the sending country relative to recipient country. The
denitions of the variables are explained in the appendix. Each column corresponds baseline regressions using the sub samples
generated based on income levels of the sample countries. For example \high income to high income" refers to the sub-sample
where both sending and recipient country are high income countries.
21Table 5: Baseline regressions for the GSOEP
Probability to remit and log amount remitted-OLS
total family support savings for later other purposes
married head hh 0.020 (0.8) -0.158 (0.6) 0.188 (1.0) 0.273 (1.5)
ln household income 5.854 (5.1) 4.487 (3.4) 0.573 (4.8 0.525 (4.5)
unemployed -1.334 (6.4) -1.178 (6.1) -0.541 (4.1) -0.467 (3.0)
not in the labor force -1.567 (7.9) -1.347 (6.9) -0.507 (4.2) -0.588 (4.5)
male head hh 1.015 (4.2) 0.848 (3.7) 0.437 (3.5) 0.476 (3.4)
age 0.041 (5.2) 0.039 (5.1) 0.020 (3.3) 0.019 (3.2)
years of education -0.071 (1.9) -0.061 (1.6) -0.038 (1.5) -0.015 (0.6)
number adults hh host -0.225 (2.6) -0.237 (2.8) -0.179 (2.6) -0.182 (2.4)
number children hh host -0.142 (2.3) -0.159 (2.6) -0.140 (2.8) -0.056 (1.1)
number employed hh host -0.167 (3.0) -0.226 (4.4) 0.025 (0.6) 0.051 (1.2)
spouse abroad 1.751 (5.3) 1.964 (5.8) 0.874 (2.3) 0.991 (2.4)
children abroad 1.833 (9.8) 2.050 (9.9) 0.968 (4.0) 0.897 (3.6)
years since migration 0.115 (2.2) 0.211 (2.3) 0.048 (1.3) -0.021 (0.5)
years since migration
2 -0.004 (2.8) -0.004 (3.0) -0.002 (1.9) -0.001 (0.1)
childhood residence:
medium city 1.159 (4.8) 0.857 (3.5) 0.763 (4.0) 0.540 (3.0)
small city 0.858 (4.2) 0.644 (3.2) 0.596 (4.6) 0.364 (2.3)
countryside 0.891 (4.6) 0.680 (3.6) 0.617 (4.6) 0.409 (2.7)
region dummies yes yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes yes
country of origin dummies yes yes yes yes
adjusted r-squared 0.191 0.229 0.092 0.078
number of observations 6772 5766 4340 4503
Notes: We presents results using OLS. We also estimated tobit models and the results are similar. Dependent variable is the
Logarithm (amount remitted+1). GSOEP data (1984-1990, 1992, 1994). Weighted regression using household weights. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by household heads.
22Table 6: Individual characteristics
Probability to remit and log amount remitted
Specication Total Family support Savings for later Other purposes
OLS
(1) dwelling owner -1.292 (5.7) -0.746 (3.6) -0.760 (5.4) -0.788 (5.4)
(2) probability to nd similar job
easy 0.200 (0.9) -0.175 (0.8) 0.311 (1.7) 0.423 (2.2)
dicult -0.020 (0.1) -0.157 (0.9) -0.039 (0.3) 0.098 (0.6)
(3) feel German -0.134 (2.5) -0.126 (2.4) -0.103 (2.2) -0.104 (2.3)
(4) cook German food -0.284 (3.5) -0.153 (2.0) -0.128 (1.9) -0.187 (2.5)
(5) listen German music -0.095 (1.5) -0.028 (0.5) -0.132 (2.0) -0.020 (0.3)
(6) job satisfaction -0.047 (1.9) -0.070 (2.6) -0.001 (0.1) -0.032 (1.5)
(7) annual doctor visits 0.004 (1.7) 0.003 (1.5) 0.002 (1.0) 0.001 (0.4)
(8) have life insurance -0.0388 (3.7) -0.438 (3.4) -0.251 (2.6) -0.023 (0.2)
INDIVIDUAL FE
(9) dwelling owner -0.828 (2.7) -0.311 (1.2) -0.618 (2.2) -0.872 (2.7)
(10) probability to nd similar job
easy 0.560 (3.2) 0.171 (1.1) 0.475 (2.8) 0.502 (2.6)
dicult 0.218 (1.6) 0.117 (1.9) 0.241 (1.9) 0.192 (1.2)
(11) feel German 0.038 (0.8) 0.026 (0.6) 0.031 (0.7) -0.085 (1.8)
(12) job satisfaction -0.038 (1.7) -0.038 (1.7) -0.026 (1.1) -0.051 (1.8)
(13) annual doctor visits -0.003 (1.6) -0.005 (2.9) 0.001 (0.2) -0.003 (1.6)
(14) have life insurance -0.025 (0.3) -0.016 (0.2) -0.178 (1.9) -0.018 (0.2)
Notes: Every row corresponds to a separate regression and each regression has the control variables as in Table 5. We present
results using OLS and individual xed eects. We also estimated tobit models and the results are similar. Dependent variable
is the Logarithm (amount remitted+1). GSOEP data (1984-1990, 1992, 1994). Weighted regression using household weights.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by household in the OLS specication. In specication (1),
renter is the omitted category. In specication (2), almost impossible is the omitted category. In specication (3), the independent
variables is the answer to the question: Irrespective of one's nationality one can have a sense of belonging to the country in which
one lives? Which of the following applies in your case? (Foreigners only) 5 I feel totally German, 4 I feel more German than not,
3 I feel more German sometimes and more foreign at other times, 2 I feel mostly foreign, 1 I feel totally foreign. In specication
(4), the independent variables is the answer to the question: How often do you eat your native food? 1 exclusively, 2 mostly, 3
some of both, 4 seldom, 5 never. In specication (5), the independent variables is the answer to the question: When you listen to
music: how often do you listen to music from your native country? 1 exclusively, 2 mostly, 3 some of both, 4 seldom, 5 never. In
specication (6), job satisfaction takes values 0-10.
23Table 7: Characteristics of the receiving countries from Euro-barometer
Probability to remit and log amount remitted
Specication Total Family support Savings for later Other purposes
OLS
(1) happiness -1.870 (2.6) -1.163 (1.9) -1.633 (2.3) -1.287 (1.7)
(2) peacefulness -0.704 (3.0) -0.420 (2.0) -0.311 (1.8) -0.198 (0.8)
(3) religiosity -9.998 (1.9) -4.925 (1.0) -15.961 (3.1) -3.154 (0.4)
(4) political ideology (rightist) -0.609 (1.8) -0.173 (0.6) -0.722 (2.2) -0.868 (2.4)
INDIVIDUAL FE
(5) happiness -1.621 (2.4) -1.306 (2.2) -1.214 (2.1) -1.548 (2.1)
(6) peacefulness -0.582 (2.7) -0.450 (2.4) -0.149 (0.8) -0.243 (1.1)
(7) religiosity -10.980 (2.1) -7.295 (1.8) -12.759 (2.6) -2.744 (0.5)
(8) political ideology (rightist) -0.592 (2.1) -0.205 (0.8) -0.529 (1.9) -0.997 (3.0)
Notes: Every row corresponds to a separate regression and each regression has the control variables as in Table 5. We present results
using OLS and individual xed eects. We also estimated tobit models and the results are similar. The independent variables
are the characteristics of country of origins for the immigrants living in Germany. Dependent variable is the Logarithm (amount
remitted+1). GSOEP data (1984-1990, 1992, 1994). Weighted regression using household weights. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by household in the OLS specication. The independent variables are calculated from
the Euro-barometer survey and the variables are explained in the data appendix in detail.
Table 8: Macroeconomic conditions of the receiving countries
Probability to remit and log amount remitted
Specication Total Family support Savings for later Other purposes
OLS
(1) corruption -0.449 (5.2) -0.516 (6.1) -0.114 (1.6) -0.151 (2.1)
(2) freedom 0.279 (5.2) 0.282 (5.7) 0.091 (2.1) 0.120 (2.8)
(3) civil rights 0.470 (5.2) 0.480 (7.5) 0.181 (3.2) 0.176 (3.3)
INDIVIDUAL FE
(4) exchange rate volatility 0.075 (1.2) 0.051 (1.0) 0.094 (1.6) 0.008 (0.1)
(Germany-country of origin)
(5) German interest rate -0.084 (1.0) -0.010 (0.6) -0.131 (2.1) -0.076 (0.3)
(6) bilateral trade 0.343 (0.7) -0.312 (0.7) 0.760 (2.1) 0.821 (1.9)
Notes: Every row corresponds to a separate regression and each regression has the control variables as in Table 5. We present results
using OLS and individual xed eects. We also estimated tobit models and the results are similar. The independent variables
are the characteristics of country of origins for the immigrants living in Germany. Dependent variable is the Logarithm (amount
remitted+1). GSOEP data (1984-1990, 1992, 1994). Weighted regression using household weights. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by household, and country dummies are not included in the OLS specication.
24Table 9: Characteristics of receiving countries from World Values Survey
Probability to remit and log amount remitted-OLS
Specication Total Family support Savings for later Other purposes
(1) happiness -0.688 (2.8) -0.686 (2.7) -0.103 (0.5) -0.292 (1.5)
(2) condence in social security system -0.215 (0.7) -0.489 (1.9) -0.076 (0.3) -0.017 (0.8)
(3) condence in government 2.519 (2.6) 2.583 (2.3) 0.917 (1.1) 1.641 (2.0)
(4) condence in health care system -0.858 (2.3) -1.311 (3.4) -0.238 (0.8) -0.024 (0.1)
(5) satisfaction with democracy -0.603 (2.4) -0.619 (2.5) -0.095 (0.4) -0.189 (0.9)
(6) prohibit immigration -1.154 (3.0) -1.448 (3.7) -0.196 (0.6) -0.087 (0.3)
(7) most people can be trusted -0.034 (3.0) -0.041 (3.6) -0.006 (0.6) -0.003 (0.3)
(8) chance of involvement in a war 9.844 (3.5) 7.161 (2.7) 3.557 (2.0) 5.099 (2.7)
(9) political ideology (rightist) 0.716 (2.7) 0.828 (3.1) 0.145 (0.6) 0.077 (0.3)
(9) good political system today -0.299 (2.6) -0.333 (3.0) -0.051 (0.5) -0.044 (0.5)
(10) political system improved 0.251 (1.6) 0.361 (2.1) 0.058 (0.4) -0.145 (0.9)
Notes: Every row corresponds to a separate regression and each regression has the control variables as in Table 5. We present
results using OLS. We also estimated tobit models and the results are similar. The independent variables are the characteristics
of country of origins for the immigrants living in Germany. Dependent variable is the Logarithm (amount remitted+1). GSOEP
data (1984-1990, 1992, 1994). Weighted regression using household weights. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered by household and country of origin dummies are not included in the regressions. The independent variables
are calculated from the world values survey and the variables are explained in the data appendix in detail.
6 Appendix
25Appendix Table A1 Descriptive statistics for macroeconomic variables
Obs Mean Standard Dev. Min Max
BANKj 22244 0.69 0.19 0.23 1
BRITISHij 24734 0.26 0.43 0 1
BUDHISTnij 24734 0.06 0.23 0 1
CHRISTnij 24734 0.25 0.43 0 1
CHRISTi MUSLIMj 24734 0.18 0.38 0 1
CIVIL RIGHTS
i j 22476  0.06 2.35 -5.9 6.9
COMMON COLONY 24734 0.01 0.11 0 1
COMMON LANGUAGE 24734 0.14 0.34 0 1
CONFUCnij 24734 0.01 0.11 0 1
CONTIGIOUS 24734 0.01 0.12 0 1
CORRUPTION
i j 22648 0.30 3.05 -8 7.8
DISTANCEij 24734 8.74 0.82 2.13 9.88
FIGHT
i j 24734  0.90 0.39  1 1.31
FINANCIAL OPENNESSi j 21436 0.56 1.56  1.83 2.54
FREEDOM
i j 22797  0.06 5.62 -14.30 14.44
FRENCHij 24734 0.15 0.35 0 1
GOVERNMENT
i j 22797 0.04 5.03 {11.64 12
RGDP
i j 23542  0.24 1.00 -2.93 2.9
HAPPINESS
i j 24734  0.34 1.37 {1 3.11
HINDUnij 24734 0.03 0.18 0 1
IMPORT
i j 17918 1.79 2.32 0 12.93
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
i j 22797  0.08 5.24 -15.81 15.66
INTEREST RATE
i j 18088  1.28 17.27 -61.03 63.11
MUSLIMnij 24734 0.02 0.40 0 1
REMITTANCEij 5728 0.11 0.15 0 0.72
TRADEij 17364 2.38 2.55 0 12.99
ORTHODOXnij 24734 0.09 0.028 0 1
PROHIBIT
i j 24734  0.47 1.16  1 2.71
RULE OF LAW
i j 22797 0.09 6.28  15.77 16
SATISFACTION OF LIFE
i j 24734 0.26 2.69  -1 16
SPANISHij 24734 0.12 0.32 0 1
VOLEXCH
i j 23373  0.09 0.29  41.96 1.51
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics of the macroeconomic variables. The denitions of the variables are explained in
detail in the text.
26Appendix Table A2 GSOEP: Descriptive statistics for the household heads
Variable mean stdev
ln household income 7.2 0.49
age 43.2 11.2
own dwelling 8.2 0.02
rent dwelling 91.8 0.02
employed 82.3 0.02
unemployed 7.5 0.02
not in the labor force 10.2 0.03
male 87.8 0.02
female 12.2 0.02




not married 20.9 0.02
employed hh 1.9 1.30
spouse abroad 6.1 0.01
spouse not abroad 93.9 0.01
children abroad 10.0 0.02
children not abroad 90.0 0.02
years since migration 19.1 5.94
childhood residence:
large city 19.3 0.04
medium city 14.6 0.04
small city 25.5 0.05
countryside 40.6 0.05
number of observations 10144
number of household heads 1802
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics of the variables in the GSOEP for the years 1984-1990, 1992, 1994. Individual
information corresponds to the head of household. Means are reported for the continuous variables and proportions are reported
for categorical variables.
27Appendix Table A3 GSOEP: Descriptive statistics by country of origin
(1) (2) (3)
country of origin sample ratio proportion ln total
sent money money sent
East-Germany 2.5 8.6 7.37
Turkey 31.3 46.4 8.05
Yugoslavia 15.5 54.5 8.26
Greece 13.1 48.1 8.32
Italy 19.9 25.5 8.26
Spain 11.5 40.8 8.35
Austria 0.1 7.2 7.32
Bulgaria 0.3 46.5 7.87
Albania 0.2 73.7 8.61
Croatia 3.5 57.2 8.12
Bosnia 1.3 63.3 8.51
Macedonia 0.3 50.0 7.71
Slovenia 0.4 35.7 7.65
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics of the variables in the GSOEP for the years 1984-1990, 1992, 1994 by country of
origin. Individual information corresponds to the head of household. Sample ratio is the percentage of the corresponding category
in the whole sample. Proportion sent money is the percentage of the corresponding category who sent money back home. The
third column shows the average of log total money sent for each row.
Appendix Table A4 GSOEP: transition matrix for sending remittance
did not sent money sent money
did not sent money 79.80 20.20
sent money 28.86 71.14
total 57.40 42.60
Notes: This table shows the transition matrix for whether the household have sent money back home in that year or not using the
GSOEP for the years 1984-1990, 1992, 1994. Individual information corresponds to the head of household.
6.1 DATA APPENDIX
 REMITTANCEij: Remittance ows from source country (j) to home country(i) in millions USD dollars source: World
Bank
 IMMIGRATIONij: The number of the migrants living in country source(j) originated from home country (i). Source
World Bank
 TRADEij: imports of goods by source countries from home countries (average 2001{2005). Source, International
Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.
 INTEREST RATE: Interest rates; averaged for the last ve years (averaged 2001{2005). Source, International Mone-
tary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
 DISTANCE: logarithm of great circle distance in miles between the capital cities of source and host country. Source:
 COMMON LANGUAGE: dummy taking the value of 1 if source and host country share a common language. Source:
 COLONY: dummy taking the value of 1 if source and host country ever had a colonial relationship.
 COMMON COLONY : dummy takes 1 if both countries have had a common colonizer. item COMMON COLONYY: takes
1 if both countries after 1945, have ever had a colonial link.
 CONTIGIOUS: dummy variable takes 1 if both receiving and sending country is sharing same borderline.
28 RGDP: log of GDP per capita level in current US dollars. Averaged for years 2001-2005. Source: World Bank,
World Development Indicators.
 FINANCIAL OPENNESS is an index for Financial openness. Source: Chinn and Ito (2007).
 CORRUPTION is an measures how corrupt a country is. Averaged between years 2001 and 2005. Source: Corruption
and Perception Index Transperancy.org.
 FREEDOM is an index for expressing the beliefs prepared. Averaged for years 2001{2005. Source: Freedom house
report.
 CIVIL RIGHTS is an index for civil rights. Averaged for years 2001{2005. Source: Freedom house report.
 RULE OF LAW is an index for measuring functioning of the law and rules in the corresponding country. Source:Freedom
House reports
 HAPPINESS happy is an index measures \How happy are you" averaged for last 5 years or the data available period.
 SATISFACTION OF LIFE is an index measures life satisfaction averaged for last 5 years or the data available period.
 PROHIBITis an index measures immigrant policy.Averaged for last 5 years or the data available period.
 FIGHT is an index measures be willing to ght in war for your country. Averaged for last 5 years or the data
available period.
 FRENCHij is a binary variable takes 1 if both sending and receiving countries are French colonies.
 SPANISHij is a binary variable takes 1 both sending and receiving countries are Spanish colonies.
 BRITISHij is a binary variable takes 1 if both sending and receiving countries are British colonies.
 BUDHIST is a binary variable takes 1 if at least 80 % total population of the corresponding country is Buddhist.
 CHRIST is a binary variable takes 1 if at least 80 % total population of the corresponding country is Christian.
 CONFUC is a binary variable takes 1 if at least 80 % total population of the corresponding country is Confucians.
 HINDU is a binary variable takes 1 if at least 80 % total population of the corresponding country is Hindu.
 MUSLIM is a binary variable takes 1 if at least 80 % total population of the corresponding country is Muslim.
 ORTHODOX is a binary variable takes 1 if at least 80 % total population of the corresponding country is Orthodox.
 VOLEXCH is the volatility of the exchange rate for the corresponding country. Source: IMF's IFS statistics.
 For the religion dummies, Xnij means that more than 80 % of the sending country's population is not from that
religion (X) and at least 80 % of the receiving country's population is from religion(X). For example,BUDHISTnij is
a binary variable takes 1 if the sending country is not Buddhist, and receiving country is Buddhist.
 For some variables, Xi j refers Xi   Xj. For example CIVIL RIGHTSi j is equal to CIVIL RIGHTSi   CIVIL RIGHTSj:
Variables from the World Values Survey
A165.- Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with
people?: 1 Most people can be trusted 2 Cant be too careful
29A170. All things considered, how satised are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help with your
answer? 1 Dissatised 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Satised
E077. I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much condence you have in them: is
it a great deal of condence, quite a lot of condence, not very much condence or none at all?
The Social security system: 4 A great deal 3 Quite a lot 2 Not very much 1 None at all
E079. I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much condence you have in them: is
it a great deal of condence, quite a lot of condence, not very much condence or none at all?
The government: 4 A great deal 3 Quite a lot 2 Not very much 1 None at all
E084. I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much condence you have in them: is
it a great deal of condence, quite a lot of condence, not very much condence or none at all?
The health care system: 4 A great deal 3 Quite a lot 2 Not very much 1 None at all
E110. On the whole are you very satised, rather satised, not very satised or not at all satised with the way democracy is
developing in our country?: 4 Very satised 3 Rather satised 2 Not very satised 1 Not at all satised
E143. How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government
should do?: 4 Let anyone come 3 As long as jobs available 2 Strict limits 1 Prohibit people from coming
E013. How likely do you think it is that there will be another major war in which your country will be involved in the next ve
years?: 1 Not at all likely 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very likely
E033. In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally
speaking?: 1 Left 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right
E111. People have dierent views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are
going: 1 means very bad; 10 means very good.
Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?: 1 Bad 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very good
E112. People have dierent views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are
going: 1 means very bad; 10 means very good. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it was?
[in former communist countries: under communist regime]
[ in countries where recently a change of regime xx has taken place: under xx regime;]
[ in countries where no regime change has taken place: ten years ago]
1 Bad 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very good
Variables from the Euro-barometer Survey
Satisfaction with life: 4 very satised 3 fairly satised 2 not very sat. 1 not at all sat.
Satisfaction with democracy: 4 very satised 3 fairly satised 2 not very sat. 1 not at all sat.
Happiness: 3 very happy 2 pretty happy 1 not too happy
Political discussion: 3 frequently 2 occasionally 1 never
Next year: Peaceful than now: 3 more peaceful 2 remains the same 1 more troubled
Religion: Important: 3 great importance 2 some importance 1 little importance
Left-Right self-placement: scale 1-10
30